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CHANGES IN HUNGARIAN SOCIETY
SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Rudolf Andorka
I. Introduction
High-quality social statistical data have been available for Hun-
gary since the establishment of the Hungarian Statistical Service
(HSS) circa 1867. Since 1963, when sociology was reinstituted in
Hungary, in-depth studies on Hungarian society have been
published extensively. Both social statistical and sociological
studies continue to present data on the rapid changes that have
been occurring in Hungarian society since the change of regime
in 1990. In this paper, I intend to summarize some key findings
of these studies.1
In 1989 and 1990, Hungary underwent revolutionary change
with the rapid and profound transformation of economic, social,
and political structures and institutions. It would be a mistake,
however, to conclude that all that characterized Hungarian soci-
ety before 1990 is forgotten or viewed as no longer relevant to
the understanding of present and future developments in Hun-
gary. On the contrary, the social characteristics of the socialist
period, from 1945 to 1990 — both the negative and positive —
will deeply influence Hungary in the next decades, just as the
social conditions of the pre-1945 system influenced the society of
the socialist period.
In interpreting the changes in Hungarian society since 1945, I
shall use the theory of modernization. The best theory for
understanding what is currently happening in Eastern Central
Europe is Edward Tiryakian’s “Modernization: exhumetur in
pace.”2 By modernization, I refer to a complex of economic,
social, and political development processes that lead to (1) an
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efficient market economy providing a high level of consump-
tion, (2) a democratic political system, and (3) modern mentali-
ties.
II. Hungarian History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries: Attempts at Modernization
The economic, social, and political history of Hungary in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be seen as a series of
failed attempts to catch up with the more advanced Western
European societies. The “reform period” of the first half of the
nineteenth century ended in failure as a consequence of Hun-
gary’s defeat in its war for independence in 1849. The takeoff
period of industrialization under the Austro-Hungarian monar-
chy, beginning with the “constitutional compromise” with the
Hapsburg government, ended with the First World War.
Finally, the conservative regime of the interwar period resulted
in catastrophe at the end of the Second World War. The failure
of these three attempts at modernization resulted in deep eco-
nomic and social crises.
The socialist period (1947–1990) was Hungary’s fourth
attempt to modernize itself and to catch up economically and
socially with Western Europe. This attempt came under the
leadership of the Soviet model of the Communist Party, which
was characterized by a totalitarian (or “authoritarian”) political
system, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and state ownership of the
vast majority of productive assets. In certain respects, modern-
ization was achieved. The country was industrialized and
urbanized, the educational level of the population increased, the
standard of living was raised, and housing was improved. How-
ever, this attempt to catch up proved to be another failure. It
became clear that by following the Soviet model, the distance
between Western Europe and Hungary not only did not dimin-
ish, it increased.
The fourth attempt failed because an efficient modern econ-
omy cannot function when the state owns the overwhelming
majority of productive assets. The privatization of productive
assets, however, cannot be implemented in a totalitarian or
authoritarian political system.3 Nor can modern mentalities
develop in such a system. Once these facts were recognized by
the majority of the population and by an important part of the
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political elite, the socialist system collapsed. In 1990, the goal of
the society, government, and all political parties represented in
the Parliament was modernization, or “catching up” with West-
ern Europe, both economically and politically.
The transition to a market economy (based on private owner-
ship of productive assets) and to a democratic political system
proved to be more difficult than was initially imagined. At pre-
sent, the outcome of this transition cannot be accurately pre-
dicted. In order to forecast how Hungarian society might
develop by 2005, we have to separate the developments during
the socialist period that can provide a basis for further modern-
ization from the elements that must be considered as failures.
We have to analyze the nature of the rapid social changes that
occurred from 1990 to 1993 in order to distinguish those which
lead to Western European conditions and those which hinder
this process.
III. Social Structure and Conditions
The following analysis will concentrate on seven dimensions of
social conditions: social strata; social mobility; income, standard
of living, and housing; education; health; lifestyle, culture, and
social contacts; and, finally, deviant behavior, anomie, and
alienation
A. Social Strata
In terms of the social status categories based on occupational
characteristics utilized by the standard Western sociological lit-
erature to describe industrial societies4, it is apparent that the
social structure of socialist Hungary was rather similar to that of
Western capitalist societies. (The categories, called “classes” in
the above-mentioned Western model, were usually termed
“strata” in Hungarian sociology.) The two most visible differ-
ences were (1) the lower percentage in Hungary of self-
employed artisans and merchants, i.e., the “petite bourgeoisie,”
among active earners and (2) the fact that only very few of the
active earners in agriculture in Hungary were self-employed
peasants. The majority were agricultural employees (along with
cooperative peasants, who were classified in the same category).
Macalester International Vol. 2
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Between 1980 and 1990, a move toward a capitalist system could
be observed as the percentage of self-employed artisans and
merchants increased dramatically and that of self-employed
peasants began to grow. Employment in agriculture declined at
a more rapid rate than in earlier years.
The hierarchy of these social strata was also rather similar to
the hierarchy observed in Western capitalist societies. Measured
by the average per capita household income, managers and pro-
fessionals were at the top of the hierachy, clerical and skilled
workers were in the middle, and nonskilled workers and peas-
ants were at the bottom. And the per capita household income
of higher-level managers was far above the income level of
lower-level managers and professionals. The income gap
between these social strata was less than the gap in the majority
of Western capitalist countries, but not much less than that in
Western countries with the smallest income gap — Sweden and
Finland.5 It ought to be noted that all other indicators of social
differentiation, such as housing conditions or ownership of con-
sumer durables (particularly personal cars), demonstrate greater
differences between social strata than per capita income. Thus,
Hungarian society was far from equal.
From the Hungarian Household Panel Surveys in 1992, 1993,
and 1994, we have data on the per capita income of members of
different social strata since the transition.6 These data demon-
strate that the income differentiation by social strata increased
after 1990 and continues to do so. The rank order of the social
strata, however, has remained relatively unchanged, and it pre-
sents the usual picture of advanced capitalist societies.
According to Djilas’s theory of the “new class” ruling the
socialist societies,7 these standard social categories do not ade-
quately describe the social structure of societies based on a
“command” economy and on a totalitarian-authoritarian politi-
cal system. Recently, E. O. Wright8 formulated a more elaborate
theory of structure based on Marxist concepts: in capitalist soci-
ety the most important unequally distributed productive assets
are the means of production, the capital assets. The mechanism
of exploitation is the market, and the ruling class is the capitalist
class. In the statist society, which might be identified with the
Central and Eastern European socialist societies, the principal
asset is organizational power, the mechanism of exploitation is
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planned appropriation, and the ruling class is composed of
bureaucrats and managers. In the future global society, the most
important asset will be knowledge and skill, the mechanism of
exploitation will be the negotiated redistribution of surplus, and
the ruling class will be the class of experts, i.e., professionals. In
terms of this theory, the state bureaucrats and managers were at
the top of the social structure in Hungary in the socialist period.
Konrád and Szelényi, in their book written in the mid-1970s,
concluded that in Hungary, intellectuals are on the road to class
power.9 In other words, professionals will become the ruling
class in Hungary, either replacing the state bureaucrats and
managers or merging with them into one class.
There is no doubt that during the socialist period, Hungarian
society was ruled by a powerful elite of bureaucrats and man-
agers who held much more concentrated power than did the
political elite of democratic societies. Two important problems
hinder the empirical analysis of this power elite, the first being
that the definition of the power elite is far from clear. The
famous nomenklatura lists published after the transition included
only about 1,000 high-level positions. The actual power of differ-
ent positions (e.g., managers of state enterprises and presidents
of cooperatives) changed over time. Second, by any definition,
the power elite was very small, with no more than 10,000 people
holding substantial power. In a sample survey, the number of
interviewed persons belonging to this power elite is too small to
draw reliable conclusions about their social characteristics as a
group.
It is also doubtful that the social stratum nearest the power
elite, in terms of income and living conditions, was the profes-
sional stratum. Empirical studies in the 1980s clearly demon-
strated that bureaucrats and managers were becoming more and
more “professionalized.” More of them earned a third degree,
their lifestyle and ambitions also became more similar to those
of the professionals, and they were recruited predominantly
from the professional stratum. This professionalization of the
power elite was mainly the consequence of a generational
change in the elite. Members of the power elite who entered it in
the 1950s are now retired. The younger entrants increasingly
were professionals. In the latter half of the 1980s, this process of
professionalization was clearly more advanced in the state
Macalester International Vol. 2
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bureaucracy and among the managers than among the party
bureaucrats.10
Szelényi later stated that the plan of the intellectuals to
become the ruling class in the socialist society through the
implementation of market-oriented economic reforms failed
because of the resistance of the bureaucracy.11 This tendency to
professionalize the bureaucracy provides one of the explana-
tions of the peaceful transition in Hungary. “Professional” mem-
bers of the bureaucracy stuck much less to their bureaucratic
power than did the “pure” bureaucrats, as the former hoped to
maintain a privileged social position in the market-oriented and
democratic system. As Hankiss noted before the regime change,
if the “professional” bureaucrats are offered the possibility of
becoming capitalists, they are less resistant to the loss of their
powerful position in the government.12
Three and a half years after the regime transition, the top of
the Hungarian social structure is still in full turmoil. In a paper
written after the transition, Konrád and Szelényi distinguish
three groups contending for the top position in the hierarchy —
the bourgeoisie, the bureaucrats, and the professionals — and
hypothesize that some combination of these will rule Hungary.13
In addition to the above-mentioned occupational differentia-
tions in the Hungarian social structure, there is an ethnically
based differentiation: the Roma, or Gypsy, population. Because
of the difficulties of assessing the Gypsy population by using
sociological surveys (even defining “Gypsy” is problematic),
very few studies have been done.14 Therefore, even a simple
population count of the Gypsy ethnic group is based only on an
estimate of five hundred thousand, which represents approxi-
mately 5 percent of the population. However, while the Gypsy
population is growing, the rest of the population is declining.
Gypsies are overrepresented in the least educated, most under-
privileged stratum.
B. Social Mobility
Hungary has exceptionally rich data sources on social mobility
from the censuses of 1930 and 1949 and from the social mobility
surveys of 1962 – 64, 1973, 1983, and 1992.15 The data of the 1973
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survey were included in the great international comparative
survey.16 These are the main conclusions from those analyses:
• Global social mobility (the percentage of socially mobile per-
sons) increased after 1945, mainly because of the great social
structural changes caused by rapid industrialization. The
decline of the agricultural population resulted in an intensive
outflow from the peasant stratum into other strata; thus, the
growth of the working class came primarily from the peas-
antry. The majority of the increase in the non-manual stratum
originated from the working class and the peasantry.
• Contrary to official ideology, Hungarian society was no more
open than Western capitalist societies in terms of social mobil-
ity. Although the openness of society increased after 1945, no
“socialist” pattern of mobility emerged. Social mobility was,
in socialist Hungary, as unequal as in capitalist societies.
• The openness of society declined slightly in the 1970s and
1980s, as the inheritance of privileged and underprivileged
social positions began to increase. The first analysis of social
mobility data was the survey of 1992, which does not indicate
important changes in the openness of society for that period.
On one hand, the growth of small and medium self-employed
artisans, merchants, and entrepreneurs opened a new channel
of mobility. On the other hand, economic depression slowed
down changes in the socioeconomic structure, which is the
driving force of structural mobility.17
Since the transition period, one special aspect of social mobil-
ity — the change in the elite strata — has become a matter of
immense public interest. It has often been claimed that the elite
of the socialist period was not replaced by a new elite; conse-
quently, there was no real change of regime in Hungary.
In order to analyze this problem, the elite must first be
defined. As already mentioned, a relatively small power elite
ruled Hungary during the socialist period. After the regime
transition, the elite seemed to widen to include the most success-
ful private entrepreneurs and the managers of large (partly for-
eign) private enterprises. In other words, an economic elite
joined the cultural elite (i.e., the leading intellectuals) at the top
of the pyramid. The elite also became less homogeneous, and
Macalester International Vol. 2
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the political, economic, and cultural elite became more indepen-
dent of one another than during the socialist period.
The top of the political elite (i.e., the members of government,
the leaders of similar state administration institutions, and the
leaders of the political parties) have been almost completely
replaced (with the obvious exception of the Socialist Party lead-
ers). The new political elite originated almost exclusively from
the professional stratum, especially from the top scientific and
literary intelligentsia. At the middle levels of state administra-
tion, i.e., among the undersecretaries and department heads in
the ministries, many more people from the socialist state admin-
istration can be found who define themselves, as in Western
democratic societies, as politically neutral administrators loyal
to the given government.
The economic elite consists of two groups: (a) the managers of
state-owned enterprises, who are often the same managers from
the socialist period, and (b) the private entrepreneurs and man-
agers of private enterprises, who come partly from the small pri-
vate sector that developed during the socialist period and partly
from the professional stratum. A large number of the former
political elite of the socialist period entered this new economic
elite by converting their expert knowledge and political connec-
tions into financial assets, following the pattern of the capitalist
societies of “reconversion of different types of capital.”18
The cultural elite—leading scientists, authors, artists, journal-
ists, and media — remained almost unchanged after the transi-
tion. One reason is the fact that the cultural elite preserved at
least some independence from the political elite throughout the
socialist period. Another is that a long time is needed to acquire
cultural capital, i.e., the knowledge and the skills needed to be
members of the cultural elite.19
Thus, the replacement of the elite following the transition is
proceeding in the usual way — through structural and institu-
tional changes. It ought to be remembered that the communist
power elite was unable to bring about a complete replacement
of the Hungarian elite in the 1950s. Therefore, the commonly
held belief that a change of regime has not taken place is not jus-
tified.
Rudolf Andorka
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C. Income, Standard of Living, and Housing
Since 1945, the standard of living in Hungary has risen from a
very low level. The index of per capita real income, using the
1950 standard as 100, reached 383 in 1989, according to the offi-
cial statistical yearbooks. Other indicators confirm this improve-
ment: the percentage of dwellings with piped water increased
from 17 percent in 1949 to 83 percent in 1990, the number of per-
sonal cars per 100 households increased from 1 in 1960 to about
43 in 1991, and the number of television sets per 100 households
increased from 3 in 1960 to approximately 118 in 1991.
Since the second half of the 1970s, however, the improvement
in the standard of living slowed, then almost stagnated. The real
wage index attained its highest value in 1978, then declined by
12 percent from 1978 to 1989. At the same time, the real per
capita income slowly increased by 13 percent in 12 years. This
increase can be explained by two factors: (a) the real value of
total social benefits increased, primarily because of the increase
in the number of pensioners, and (b) the supplementary income
from the secondary economy increased dramatically.
It is not easy to estimate the contribution of income from the
secondary economy to the general standard of living. According
to the household income survey of 1987, 21 percent of house-
hold income originated from private and secondary economic
activities. According to a survey in 1988, 81 percent of adult
males and 70 percent of adult females participated in some
income-supplementing activity. According to the time budget
survey of 1986–87, the average daily time males age 15–69 spent
in secondary economic activities was 132 minutes; that of
females of the same age was 64 minutes. This time amounts to
more than half of the average time spent in the main job in the
“socialist sector.” One might conclude that growing participa-
tion in secondary activity was an important factor mitigating a
decline in the standard of living.20
After the transition, average income declined. The Gross
Domestic Product in 1993 was 21 percent lower than in 1989; the
index of per capita real income stood at 89 percent of the 1989
value; and the real wage index stood at 75 percent of the 1989
level. It ought to be added that in 1994, according to the prelimi-
nary data, the GDP had already increased by 2 percent.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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Along with the decline in average real income, income
inequalities increased from 1962 to 1987. It ought to be noted,
however, that income distribution was far from equal during the
socialist period and was more or less at the level of inequality of
Western capitalist societies such as Finland.21 Nevertheless,
income inequalities in 1993 were still not great. Simply put,
income inequalities in Hungary during the 1970s and 1980s
were similar to those of the Scandinavian countries, while in the
1990s they are at the level of those of the United Kingdom or
France.22 The increase in income inequalities is both a conse-
quence and a precondition of the transition to a market economy
based on private property.
The decline in average income and the growth of inequality
obviously resulted in growing poverty. Poverty is defined here
in absolute terms as that part of the population having a per
capita household income lower than the subsistence minimum.
Subsistence minima have been calculated by the Central Statisti-
cal Office since 1982. The per capita monthly subsistence mini-
mum was 1,990 forints in 1982 and 14,000 forints in December
1994.
In the 1980s approximately 10 percent of the population lived
below the subsistence minimum. That level increased to 15 per-
cent in 1991, to 20 percent in 1992, to 25 percent in 1993, and to
about 32 percent in 1994. The risk of poverty is especially high
among the less-educated, nonskilled workers and peasants; resi-
dents of small villages and of Eastern Hungary; the unem-
ployed, including housewives and other dependents; and
pensioners, including widows and the disabled. Among the
poor, two groups should be mentioned in particular: children
and Gypsies. All of the above groups (except the unemployed,
since before 1990 there was essentially no open unemployment)
were at risk of poverty before the regime change; however, their
disadvantaged position increased not only in absolute terms,
but also in a relative sense. It might be concluded that they all,
but particularly the children and even more so the Gypsies, are
the great losers in the transition.
Rudolf Andorka
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D. Education
Education, cultural knowledge, and skills are increasingly con-
sidered the most important factors in the development of the
economy and society in advanced countries. This is even more
true for Hungary, as the country is relatively poor in natural
resources and capital assets.
Before the Second World War, the educational level in Hun-
gary was characterized by a relatively small minority having a
very high education and the great majority being rather undere-
ducated. After the war, under the socialist system, priority was
given to the development of education: the eight-year primary
education system was introduced (replacing six-year primary
schooling), and secondary and tertiary (college) student num-
bers rapidly increased. This rapid growth was almost stopped in
the 1970s. Plans to extend obligatory primary education to ten
years were never implemented. The increase of secondary and
tertiary education was limited by a strong numerus clausus sys-
tem, by which the Ministry of Education strictly determined the
number of students that each school was allowed to admit. This
educational policy was ostensibly motivated by considerations
of manpower planning, but in reality it was probably driven by
the fear of unemployment of highly educated persons, which
could result in intensive political unrest. The consequences are
clearly visible in education by age groups. In the 1980s, enroll-
ment in tertiary education and the percentage of persons having
tertiary education in the younger adult age groups was among
the lowest in advanced societies.
After the regime transition, the new government quickly
changed this policy and encouraged higher enrollment in sec-
ondary and tertiary schools. At the same time, the popularity of
technical schools declined, since a significant number of the
young adults who studied in these schools could not find
employment because of a low demand for their skills.
E. Health
Marxist-Leninist ideology claims that in socialism, “the human
being is of the highest value.” If this principle were truly imple-
mented, the health of the population ought to have increased
Macalester International Vol. 2
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significantly. The health of a population can be measured by
indicators of mortality and life expectancy at birth and at age
thirty. Life expectancy at birth and age thirty in Hungary
increased for males and females until 1965, after which life
expectancy for males began to decline, female life expectancy at
birth continued to increase very slowly, and female life
expectancy at age thirty declined slightly. The decline in life
expectancy in a society undergoing economic and social devel-
opment is an unprecedented phenomenon. It is all the more
remarkable because a similar, although less significant, decline
in mortality rates occurred in almost every European socialist
country during the 1970s and 1980s. The life expectancy of males
and females at birth in Hungary during the 1980s was among
the lowest found in industrialized societies.23
The reason for these patterns is well known. Improvement up
to the mid-1960s was caused by the decline in mortality by infec-
tious diseases, first among infants and children. After 1965,
there was an increase in the number of deaths of adult men and
women due to coronary disease, cirrhosis of the liver, and sui-
cide. In addition, cerebrovascular disease and lung cancer
among men increased, and breast and colon cancer among
women increased.24 Mortality from these diseases had begun to
increase in the 1950s, but the trend was obscured by the decline
in mortality from infectious diseases (a decline that continued
until the mid-1960s when there was no room for further
improvement in infectious diseases). Thus, the root of the
increase in mortality goes back to the 1950s, to the “classic,” or
fully totalitarian, period of socialism.
From a medical point of view, it might be assumed that a
common factor of coronary disease and cerebrovascular disease
is hypertension. It is usually assumed, but not proven by popu-
lation surveys, that hypertension is very widespread in the
Hungarian population.
In searching for the deeper causes of poor health issues, we
should note that the deterioration in health was greatest in the
40–59 age group and that male mortality was much higher than
female mortality. Social differences also affect mortality rates.
Among men aged 50 to 59, the mortality of manual laborers is 50
percent higher than that of nonmanual workers, and the mortal-
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ity of unskilled agricultural workers is twice as high as that of
professionals.
Some of the deeper causes of the increase in mortality might
be the following:25
• Unhealthy eating habits (too much fat, too few fresh vegeta-
bles and fruit), causing hypertension and heart disease.
• Excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages, causing cir-
rhosis of the liver.
• Excessive smoking, causing lung cancer.
• Insufficient exercise, contributing to hypertension.
Last but not least, the malfunctioning health care system
might be an important factor in the poor health status of the
Hungarian population. The health care system is, in principle,
free of charge, but patients are expected to give “gratitude
money” to the medical personnel. Gratitude money is explicitly
permitted by the law, as the salaries of health care and medical
personnel are fixed at low levels in the expectation that they will
gain extra income from the gratitude money. This practice is not
satisfactory to either medical doctors or patients. The health care
provided is slow, expensive, and inadequate.26
F. Lifestyle, Culture, and Social Contacts
In the second half of the 1960s, when it became clear that the
socialist countries would not be able to achieve the per capita
GDP of the advanced capitalist countries, Soviet sociologists
introduced, or rather reinvented, the idea of “lifestyle,” imply-
ing that although the socialist societies had a lower income level,
their way of life was superior to that of capitalist societies. Supe-
rior lifestyle was demonstrated by the more intensive participa-
tion by people in socialist countries in high-level cultural
activities and in voluntary social associations.
Hungarian sociologists used to study lifestyle by “time bud-
get” surveys. Both the international time budget survey of the
mid-1960s27 and the Hungarian national time budget surveys of
the mid-1970s28 and mid-1980s29 showed that the primary char-
acteristic of Hungarian life was the very long time spent work-
ing. This was a consequence of (a) the relatively long workday;
Macalester International Vol. 2
126
12/21/95  07:54 AM      1870and2.qxd
(b) the widespread participation in the secondary economy, i.e.,
in income-supplementing work; and (c) the long hours spent
doing household chores, especially by women. The total time
spent in work activities did not diminish in the period from the
1970s to the end of the 1980s. Even though the statutory work-
day was shortened, most Hungarians used the remaining time
to work longer hours in the second economy. In 1988, 79 percent
of adult men and 70 percent of adult women participated in
some form of secondary economy.30 As the decline of the real
wage index caused a decrease in the standard of living, Hungar-
ians had to supplement their income in order to make ends
meet.
One consequence of a long workday and the accompanying
exhaustion was that there was little leisure time for cultural
activities. What leisure time there was was increasingly spent
watching television. The number of cultural products (i.e.,
books, periodicals, newspapers) stagnated. In spite of heavy
government subsidization of the arts, attendance of cinema, the-
atre, concerts, and museums declined in the 1980s.
Social contacts outside of the workplace and immediate fam-
ily were rare, partly because of lack of time, and partly because
most social groups and community associations either disap-
peared or were oppressed by the state.31
After the transition, only slow and contradictory changes took
place in the Hungarian lifestyle. Activities in the secondary
economy went from being “tolerated” to being “encouraged” by
the government, with the explicit hope that those activities
would grow into the private sector of the first economy. This is,
however, hindered by the obligation to pay taxes from the pri-
vate sector incomes. On the other hand, the need for supplemen-
tal income is increasing as a consequence of the decline of
income from primary employment. Rising unemployment in the
primary economy contributed to increased participation in the
secondary economy. Surveys done in 1992 and 1993 indicate
that participation in the traditional secondary economy is very
intensive: 55 percent of households had at least a small farm
(similar to the “household plots” of the socialist period); 43 per-
cent of adults surveyed worked on such farms; 44 percent par-
ticipated in mutual help without cash payment between
households; and 12 percent participated in paid casual work.
Rudolf Andorka
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The majority of households gained a supplemental income
(mostly in kind) from these secondary activities.32
Currently, the market for cultural products and services is in
turmoil as the subsidies from the state have diminished greatly
and as financial resources for culture have had to come through
public and private foundations by way of competitive applica-
tions. The number of voluntary associations is rapidly increas-
ing, but some of them seem to be short-lived. Some are strongly
influenced by political parties.
It could be argued that the very long hours spent working
and the little time left for cultural activities, social contacts, and
relaxation are important contributors to the stress of everyday
life. These might be at the root of the deterioration of physiolog-
ical and mental health in the Hungarian population.
G. Deviance, Anomie, and Alienation
In addition to the deterioration of health and lifestyle, the
growth of some types of deviant behavior were the clearest indi-
cators that something was going wrong in Hungarian society
during the socialist period. The suicide rate increased continu-
ously from 17.7 per 100,000 people in 1954 to 45.9 in 1984. The
death rate by cirrhosis of the liver—used internationally to mea-
sure alcoholism—increased from 5 per 100,000 in 1950 to 51.8 in
1989. Surveys on the mental health of the population demon-
strated that 34 percent of the adult population was neurotic and
24 percent showed medium-severe or very severe symptoms of
depression.33 Drug abuse was first noticed in the mid-1970s and
seemed to spread, but no reliable information is available on the
number of persons using or becoming dependent on drugs.34 It
is noteworthy that all of these deviant behaviors are more com-
mon among the lower strata of Hungarian society.
All of the above-mentioned deviant behaviors belong to the
“retreatism” type of deviance as defined by Merton.35 On the
other hand, criminality was not especially high and did not
begin to grow until the 1980s.
Astonishing and contradictory changes occurred in the rates
of deviance at the time of the regime transition. The suicide rate
began to decline in 1988. This was the year when the Party lead-
ership changed, and it seemed probable that some important
Macalester International Vol. 2
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changes in the system would follow. In 1993, the suicide rate
was 35.9 per 1,000 people. The official statistical data on alcohol
consumption showed a decline of about 8 to 9 percent, but the
rate of mortality due to cirrhosis of the liver is continuing to
increase and attained a level of 70.5 in 1992. Criminality strongly
increased after 1990, but seems to have leveled off.
Whatever changes have taken place since 1990, the rates of
deviance are very high in Hungary and are cause for serious
concern. The suicide rate is the highest in the world, and the rate
of alcoholism seems to be among the highest observed in the
world.
Both Durkheim and Merton have suggested that anomie is at
the root of deviance. Durkheim defined anomie as the weaken-
ing of the social norms of behavior, while Merton’s definition is
the impossibility of achieving socially accepted goals by socially
permitted means. Studies also point to the importance of alien-
ation in deviant behavior. Alienation can by characterized by
feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isola-
tion, and/or self-estrangement,36 or as “the unresponsiveness of
the world to the actor which subjects him to forces he neither
comprehends, nor guides.”37
The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the socialist system was
understandably strongly opposed to any study of anomie or
alienation in Hungarian society. Questions concerning anomie
and alienation were first asked in a survey in 1978.38 Four of
these questions were also included in a survey in the spring of
1990. The surveys showed that feelings of powerlessness (that it
is not worthwhile to formulate life goals), meaninglessness, and
normlessness (that one does not know what to believe in or how
to live), and estrangement of the self (that personal life is sense-
less, the person is useless) were increasing dramatically and
reached their peak at the end of the socialist period. If it is
assumed that individuals in a modern society must set long-
term goals, engage in purposeful action, have self-confidence,
and follow accepted norms of behavior in order for an advanced
market economy and political democracy to function smoothly,
it might be concluded that the increase in anomie and alienation
in Hungarian society was the greatest impediment to modern-
ization. And if the collapse of the socialist system is seen as a
consequence of the failure to fully modernize the Hungarian
Rudolf Andorka
129
12/21/95  07:54 AM      1870and2.qxd
economy and society, it might be concluded that the anomie and
alienation crisis was the biggest cause of that collapse.
It also might be argued that the anomie and alienation crisis
deepened under the totalitarian and (later) authoritarian charac-
ter of the socialist system. On the one hand, the system strived
to break down all traditional values and norms, but it was not
able to replace them by its own allegedly socialist values and
norms. On the other hand, oppression resulted in a general feel-
ing of powerlessness and of being exposed to unpredictable,
incomprehensible, and hostile powers.
Another argument is that the anomie and alienation crisis
affects not only the frequency of deviance, but that it had and
continues to have much more widespread influence on every
aspect of the Hungarian economy, society, and political system.
A highly anomic and alienated society is not able to operate an
efficient modern market economy and a democratic political
system. In other words, a highly anomic and alienated society is
lacking the modern mentality needed for a modern economy
and democratic political system, a civic culture, and the values
and norms of modern societies.
Therefore, it might be concluded that the most burdensome
heritage of the socialist system is not a poor economy or even an
underdeveloped educational system and inadequate health
care, but rather the lack of a civic culture, of a consensus of the
values and norms needed for a market economy and political
democracy.
As for future perspectives on modernization, we might agree
with Ralf Dahrendorf39 that although it was, indeed, possible to
bring about a political transition to a multiparty democracy in a
few months, we shall have to wait six years for the positive
results of the market-oriented reforms to appear. However, it
might take sixty years to develop a self-reliant civil society and
civic culture.40
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